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Abstract 
This paper considers the relationship between innovation, ownership and profitability 
for a panel of manufacturing plants in Ireland and Northern Ireland.  Previous 
literature suggests that innovators are persistently more profitable than non-
innovators, but little is known about how this link is moderated by external versus 
domestic ownership. We consider the link between innovation and profits separately 
for indigenous innovators and non-innovators and externally-owned plants. We also 
consider the determinants of innovation over the distribution of plant-level 
profitability, and find that the determinants of profitability – including innovation and 
external ownership – vary over the distribution from low to high profitability plants. 
We find support for the view that innovators and non-innovators have different 
profitability determinants, and that the profitability of externally-owned plants 
depends on very different factors to those of indigenously-owned enterprises. 
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Innovation, Ownership and Profitability 
 
1.  Introduction 
Research on the link between (product) innovation and profitability at the firm or 
establishment level suggests that innovators are persistently more profitable than non-
innovators (Geroski et al., 1993; Leiponen, 2000; Cefis and Ciccarelli, 2005).  This 
may arise because innovators, due perhaps to their market position, are able to protect 
their new products from the competition which normally erodes such profits, or 
because innovating firms are able to introduce multiple innovations over time, and are 
therefore able to maintain high profits although the profit effect of any individual 
innovation may be transitory.  The empirical evidence here is mixed.  Both Geroski et 
al. (1993) and Leiponen (2000), for instance, conclude that the profitability effects of 
individual innovations are relatively transitory, and that innovators are persistently 
more profitable than non-innovators because they have superior internal capabilities.  
By contrast, in an analysis of the US pharmaceutical industry, Roberts (1999)  finds 
evidence of a ‘conveyor belt’ of new products, each of which provides only a 
temporary monopoly position, but which collectively result in persistently high profits 
among innovating firms. 
 
In the case of economies such as Ireland, where a significant element of productive 
capacity is externally-owned, making general inferences about the relationship 
between innovation and profitability is complicated by two further issues. First, 
foreign-owned enterprises tend to be more productive (and by implication more 
profitable) than their indigenous counterparts (Stone and Peck, 1996; Griffith et al., 
2004) largely because they are more technologically advanced (Oulton 2001)1. So, 
                                                 
1 Birnie and Hitchens (1998), for example, comparing Census of Production data from Ireland and the 
UK, suggest that in 1989: manufacturing productivity in externally-owned firms in Ireland was 69 per 
cent above that of externally-owned firms in the UK, while indigenously-owned firms in Ireland lagged 
8 per cent behind indigenously-owned firms in the UK; the productivity differential between 
externally-owned and indigenously owned firms in Ireland was 178 per cent compared to 52 per cent in 
the UK. Similarly, Cassidy (2004) in his recent review of Irish productivity growth concludes that: 
‘Ireland’s superior productivity performance in manufacturing has been largely a consequence of two 
factors, namely higher productivity growth in the high-technology sectors than the European average 
and also a greater degree of specialisation in these sectors’ (p.93).  
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there may be differences between the profitability of indigenous and foreign plants 
regardless of their product innovation performance. Secondly there is evidence of a 
link between foreign ownership and innovation, with the balance of evidence 
suggesting that externally-owned firms are generally more likely to be innovative than 
indigenously-owned firms in terms of both products (Harris and Trainor, 1995; Love 
and Ashcroft, 1999), and their adoption of new process technologies (Hewitt-Dundas 
et al., 2002).  Thus, not only may innovators be different from non-innovators in 
terms of their organisational or internal capabilities aside from innovation, but 
externally-owned plants may be different from indigenously-owned plants partly as a 
result of innovation performance, complicating the innovation-profitability 
relationship. 
 
In this paper we consider the relationship between innovation and profitability for a 
large sample of manufacturing plants in Ireland and Northern Ireland.  The economies 
of both Ireland and Northern Ireland are heavily weighted towards externally-owned 
enterprises with, for example, 50.5 per cent of employment and 81.9 per cent of value 
added being accounted for by externally-owned firms in manufacturing and tradable 
services in Ireland in 2005 (Forfás, 2006)2. So, in order to allow for these differences, 
we consider not only the link between innovation and profits but do so separately for 
innovators and non-innovators, and for indigenously-owned and externally-owned 
plants3. Because of the tendency for considerable enterprise-level heterogeneity in 
performance even within industries (Bartelsman and Doms, 2000; Goddard et al., 
2006), we also consider the determinants of innovation over the distribution of plant-
level profitability, and find that the determinants of profitability – including the 
impact of innovation and external ownership – vary over the distribution from low to 
high profitability plants. Our analysis also provides support for the view that 
innovators have different capabilities from non-innovators, even among indigenous 
                                                 
2 The extent of externally-owned productive capacity in Northern Ireland is less clear with published 
figures identifying 724 foreign-owned firms operating in Northern Ireland in 2005 (DETI, 2005). 
Around a third of these plants are owned by firms with headquarters in Ireland and a further quarter by 
US firms. No figures are published, however, for the number of plants in Northern Ireland owned by 
UK firms with headquarters in other regions (see  Hewitt-Dundas et al., 2005 for a more detailed 
discussion).  
3 For Ireland, a nation state, the terms ‘externally-owned’ and ‘foreign-owned’ are of course 
synonymous. For Northern Ireland, ‘externally-owned’ plants include all those which are ‘foreign-
owned’ but also those which are headquartered in other UK regions. Throughout the paper our 
discussion relates to this wider group of externally-owned plants.  
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plants, and that it is these capabilities, rather than innovation per se, that explains their 
superior profitability.  In addition, however, we find that externally-owned plants 
have a quite different set of profitability determinants from indigenously-owned 
plants, and that this is not related directly to innovation being conducted in the Irish 
plant. 
 
2.  Linking ownership, innovation and profitability 
 
This section briefly reviews the empirical evidence on the three sets of relationships 
that are relevant to the present research: the link between innovation and profitability; 
the link between external ownership and performance; and, the link between external 
ownership and innovation. We develop a simple model linking these three influences 
which provides the basis for our empirical analysis 
 
Innovation and profitability 
 
A considerable empirical literature has considered the link between R&D inputs, 
innovation and firm profitability.  The consensus is overwhelmingly of a positive 
relationship, but with some debate about the precise nature of the relationship.  
 
Using UK firm-level data from 1972-83, Geroski and Machin (1992) and Geroski et 
al. (1993) find that there are positive effects of firm-level innovation on profits, but 
these are relatively small and transitory.  Indirect effects are larger and more long 
lasting: that is, it is the process of innovation that really matters for profitability (i.e. 
the transformation of internal capabilities), rather than the returns from individual 
innovations.  The fact that innovators persistently earn higher profits than non-
innovators is a result of three components: a small, transitory difference associated 
with the production of specific innovations; a substantial permanent difference 
(improved capabilities though the process of innovating); and a large cyclical 
component (non-innovators’ profit margins are more sensitive to trade cycle than 
those of innovators). 
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Subsequent studies have built on this work, particularly on the idea that the process of 
innovation helps build the internal capabilities of firms. Another UK study, this time 
for the period 1988-92, also finds that innovators are persistently more profitable than 
non-innovators, and that the gap is greater between persistent innovators and non-
innovators (Cefis and Ciccarelli, 2005).  Cefis and Ciccarelli (2005) also find that 
innovation has a positive effect on profitability which decreases over time (i.e. there is 
a decay effect).  Using data for Finnish manufacturing firms, Leiponen (2000) is able 
to assess the profitability effects of both process and product innovation, and finds 
that while process innovation has a positive effect on profitability product innovation 
has a negative effect.  Leiponen also finds that the profitability of innovators and non-
innovators are determined by different factors, with competencies built on knowledge-
based factors being much more important for innovators. 
Canadian data appear to confirm the positive relationship between R&D/innovation 
and profitability.  Using data on 278 quoted Canadian companies, Hanel and St-Pierre 
(2002) find that firm-level R&D capital has a positive (but lagged) effect on 
profitability, and that this effect is especially strong in sectors in which the firm is 
able to appropriate the results of its own R&D activity i.e. where there is effective 
patent protection.  This latter finding raises the issue of whether the persistently 
higher profits of innovators relative to non-innovators arises because firms introduce 
new products which are somehow protected from the competition which normally 
erodes such profits (an anti-competitive effect) or because firms successfully 
introduce multiple innovations over time, and so are able to maintain high profits 
although the profit effect of any individual innovation is transitory (an innovation 
effect).   
Roberts (1999) specifically examines these competing explanations for US 
pharmaceutical firms from 1977 to 1993, and finds strong support for the latter effect: 
US pharmaceutical firms are adept at bringing forward a conveyor belt of new 
products each of which provides only a temporary monopoly position, but which 
collectively provide persistently high profits at the firm level.  There is little support 
for the anti-competitive hypothesis in this sector: however, there may be some doubt 
about the generalisability of Roberts’ findings.  The pharmaceuticals industry is one 
largely predicated on the continuous search for new products, which is not a feature of 
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other industries. For example, using a large database of innovations over the period 
1945-82, Geroski et al. (1997) look for evidence of ‘dynamic economies of scale’ i.e. 
the possibility that increases in the volume of innovations produced by a firm in one 
time period increases the likelihood that it will continue to innovate subsequently.  
They find very little evidence that innovative activity is self-sustaining: it is very rare 
for firms to innovate persistently, and even the ones that do so do not innovate over 
long periods. 
 
External ownership and performance 
 
There is strong theoretical and empirical evidence of a positive link between external 
ownership and business performance. The traditional starting point for considering the 
determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI) from the perspective of the firm 
involves the assumed possession of some competitive or ‘ownership’ advantage, often 
knowledge-based.   The public good nature of these firm-specific assets may make 
international exploitation of the advantage by contractual means hazardous, thus 
giving an incentive to engage in FDI (Buckley and Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1988; 
Horstmann and Markusen, 1996). 
 
The consensus of the empirical literature supports the view that externally-owned 
plants are more productive than their indigenous counterparts, even within advanced 
industrialised economies (Caves, 1996;  Oulton, 2001; Griffith et al., 2004). There are 
a few caveats, however. Globerman et al. (1994), for example, find that multinationals 
in Canada are not significantly more productive than Canadian domestically owned 
firms after controlling for capital intensity and size, hence they suggest that the 
superior performance of externally-owned plants is due to their high capital intensity 
and large size. Driffield and Girma (2003) find that although externally-owned firms 
in the UK are more productive, they pay higher wages to an extent that outweighs the 
productivity advantages. 
  
A substantial body of  academic research has recognized and documented the 
contribution of multinational firms to the Irish economy (e.g. Barry and Bradley, 
1997; Love and Roper, 2001; Görg and Strobl, 2002, 2003; Girma et al., 2004; 
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Cassidy et al., 2005).  For example, Cassidy et al. (2005) analyse productivity 
determinants using Irish plant-level survey data over 1999-2002 for plants with at 
least 10 employees. They find that both domestic and foreign-owned exporting plants 
tend to be more productive (in TFP terms) than their non-exporting counterparts, with 
the results being stronger for foreign firms than domestic ones.  And, Girma et al. 
(2004) compare the productivity of purely domestic plants, domestic exporters and 
domestic multinationals in Ireland, and find evidence that the distribution of 
performance of domestic multinationals dominates that of other groups of firms4.  
 
External Ownership and Innovation 
Conceptually, the literature on the link between external ownership and innovation 
suggests the effect could be positive or negative, depending on whether the beneficial 
effects of access to group resources outweigh the potentially detrimental ‘branch 
plant’ effect.  Externally-owned plants may have access to technological resources 
such as access to large-scale R&D facilities operated by the parent, or to proprietary 
knowledge developed by the parent (Brugger and Stuckey, 1987)5.  Alternatively, 
access may be available to a wide range of non-scientific resources such as finance, an 
international marketing organisation through which new products can be diffused, or 
through patenting or other support functions.  On the other hand, the ‘branch plant’ 
literature suggests that externally-owned plants are less likely to have in-situ R&D 
facilities on which innovation crucially depends.  For example, early work by Malecki 
(1980) and Howells (1984) suggests that the location of R&D is likely to be heavily 
influenced by corporate decisions, with basic scientific research, for example, 
typically assumed to be the most scale-intensive activity and therefore more likely to 
be centralised by the parent company than applied research and development work. 
 
The limited empirical evidence on this issue appears to suggest that, on balance, a 
positive effect of external ownership on innovation is likely. Harris and Trainor 
                                                 
4 Note, however, that this may be more an issue of multi-nationality than of foreign ownership. 
5 The evidence suggests that Ireland benefits disproportionately from this type of inward knowledge or 
technology transfer. OECD provides figures on the Technology Balance of Payments (TBOP) which 
reflects the balance of inward and outward knowledge transfer through patents, licensing etc. Countries 
such as Finland and Denmark with historically higher levels of business and university R&D both have 
small positive TBOPs (c. 0.1 per cent of GDP) while Ireland has a TBOP deficit (i.e. net inward 
transfer) equivalent to 10.5 per cent of GDP.  
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(1995) conclude that externally-owned plants in Northern Ireland are more likely to 
innovate, at least in part because they devote more resources to R&D.  This 
conclusion is supported by Love et al. (1996) and Love and Ashcroft (1999), who find 
evidence that foreign-owned manufacturing plants in Scotland (but not other UK-
owned plants) are more likely to innovate than their indigenous counterparts.  In an 
analysis of innovation among UK, German and Irish manufacturing plants, Love and 
Roper (2001) find that external ownership generally has a negative effect on 
innovation intensity (number of innovations per employee); in Germany and Ireland, 
however, external ownership is positively associated with innovation success (the 
proportion of sales attributable to new products). The implication is that although 
plants which are externally owned tend to make relatively fewer innovations than 
indigenously owned enterprises, these innovations are typically more successful 
commercially. 
 
The consensus from these three separate strands of literature appears to be as follows. 
First, innovation is positively linked to profitability. Although the precise nature of 
the relationship is unclear, it appears to be linked to the superior capabilities of 
innovators.  Secondly, externally-owned enterprises generally perform better than 
domestically-owned enterprises (although this is not always the case), and Ireland has 
benefited considerably from the employment and spillover effects of this superior 
performance.  And finally, externally-owned plants are more likely to innovate, but 
may not innovate more, than indigenous plants.  A straightforward representation of 
these interactions is as follows 
πit = β0 + β1Iit + β2Oit + β3Xit + μit   (1a) 
I*it = α0 + α1Oit + α2Sit + it     (1b) 
 
where  πi is profitability  of plant i at time t,  Iit is  innovation, Oit is plant ownership, 
Xit is a vector of  other determinants of profitability, and Sit a vector of other 
determinants of innovation and we anticipate β1, β2, α1 >0.  Although simple, this 
formulation has two desirable features.  First, it allows for both effects of ownership 
identified in the empirical literature: the direct effect of ownership on profitability and 
its indirect effect through innovation.  Secondly, it allows for the possibility of 
innovators having systematically better profitability performance than non-innovators, 
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perhaps as a result of superior capabilities. Equations (1a) and (1b) can therefore be 
thought of in terms of a treatment model in which  Iit, the endogeneous binary 
decision variable, is assumed to stem from the unobserved latent variable *itI . The 
decision to obtain the treatment (i.e. the decision to innovate) is made according to 

 
otherwise
Iif
I itit ,0
0,1 *
, 
where εit is the error term of equation (1b), and it  and it  are assumed to follow a 
bivariate normal distribution with mean zero and covariance matrix 


1
 . 
 
 In the empirical analysis we use a model based on the formulation above to estimate 
the impact of ownership and innovation on profitability for a large sample of Irish 
manufacturing firms. 
 
3.  Data and Estimation Procedure 
 
Our empirical analysis is based on data from the Irish Innovation Panel (IIP) which 
provides information on the innovation, technology adoption, ownership and 
performance of manufacturing plants throughout Ireland and Northern Ireland over 
the period 1991-2002. The IIP comprises four linked surveys conducted using similar 
postal survey methodologies, sampling frames provided by the economic 
development agencies in Ireland and Northern Ireland, and questionnaires with 
common questions. Each survey covers the innovation activities and performance of 
manufacturing plants with 10 or more employees over a three year period with an 
average survey response rate of 34.5 per cent6.  In our analysis here we use the 
second, third and fourth waves of the survey covering the period 1994-2002, with 
descriptive statistics given in Table 1a.  As a result of the separate sampling process 
for the various waves the panel is unbalanced, with 2002 observations from 1494 
plants7. 
                                                 
6 Details of each wave of the survey can be found in Roper et al. (1996), Roper and Hewitt-Dundas 
(1998), Roper and Anderson (2000), Roper et al., (2004). 
7 The unbalanced nature of the panel means we cannot be sure if non appearance of a plant in a 
particular wave is a result of non-response or closure.  This means that issues such as e.g. survivor bias 
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The empirical implementation of the treatment model follows the standard literature 
in terms of dependent and independent variables.  The profitability equation (1a) uses 
a simple market structure–firm performance model augmented by indicators of 
innovation and ownership and other characteristics which are known to be linked to 
profitability such as plant vintage and capital intensity (Geroski et al.,1993; Leiponen, 
2000).  Following the innovation production function literature (Crépon et al., 1998; 
Lööf and Heshmati, 2002; Roper et al., 2006), the innovation equation (1b) allows for 
R&D and other sources of knowledge inputs as well as ownership and scale effects. 
The empirical model is thus of the form: 
                                                                                                                                                                        
logπit = β0 + β1Mjt + β2Iit + β3Oit + β4Cit + μit   (2a) 
itititititit OKSRDSIZEI   43210* ,   k=1,4    (2b) 

 
otherwise
Iif
I itit ,0
0,1 *
 
 
The set of market structure variables (Mjt) comprises three elements.  The first is a 
Herfindahl index measured by the sum of squares of plants’ market share in terms of 
sales in each two-digit industrial sector (j) in each wave of the IIP survey (HHI).  The 
second market structure indicator is a measure of the average innovation intensity of 
the two-digit sector of which the plant is part (measured as the mean proportion of 
total sales derived from products newly introduced in the last three years). And 
finally, we employ a series of two-digit dummy variables to capture other sectoral 
variations such as appropriability conditions. Economically and statistically, the 
concentration measure proxied by HHI captures different information from the set of 
industrial dummies (see Appendix Table A2). 
 
Innovation (Iit) in the IIP is represented by two variables.  For the first (binary) 
variable an innovator was defined as an establishment which had introduced any new 
or improved product or process during the previous three years. Over the whole 
sample, 62.5 per cent of plants were product innovators while 59.2 per cent were 
                                                                                                                                            
cannot be explicitly accounted for in the estimation. However, it also means that other potential issues 
such as persistent difference in performance through time are unlikely to bias the results. 
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process innovators (Table 1a). Notably, however, the overlap between the group of 
product and process innovators was not complete: around 70.2 per cent of product 
innovators were also process innovators, with 75.3 per cent of process innovators also 
being product innovators. The second innovation output measure is the proportion of 
plants’ total sales (at the end of each three year period) derived from products newly 
introduced during the previous three years. This variable – ‘innovation success’ - 
reflects not only plants’ ability to introduce new products to the market but also their 
short-term commercial success. On average, 15.1 per cent of plants’ sales were 
derived from new products across the IIP (Table 1a).  
 
Indicators of ownership (Oit) are dummy variables representing externally-owned 
plants with headquarters in the UK, US and elsewhere respectively.  Other plant 
characteristics (Cit) include measures of employment size, age, capital intensity, 
export intensity, labour qualifications, and market share (proportion of sales per two-
digit sector). 
 
The innovation equation (2b) includes firm size (SIZE ) and its square, R&D (RDit),  
external knowledge sourcing activitities (KSit), and ownership status (Oit). Four 
different types of external knowledge sourcing activity which are found to shape 
firms’ innovation behaviour are included: forward linkages to customers (Joshi and 
Sharma, 2004); backward links to either suppliers or external consultants (e.g. Horn, 
2005; Smith and Tranfield, 2005); horizontal linkages to either competitors or through 
joint ventures (Hemphill, 2003; Link et al., 2005); and linkages to universities or other 
public research centres (Roper et al., 2004). To test the likely causal effect of 
ownership on innovation suggested in the literature, we allow for the firm’s ownership 
status in the decision-making process of engaging in innovation.  
 
The measure of profitability is also derived from the IIP and is defined as sales less 
the cost of materials, labour and capital inputs. Average profitability across the final 
three waves of the IIP was £1.76m, or 19 per cent of sales.  Two notes of caution are 
worth highlighting, however, about our profitability indicator. First, it is clear from 
Table 1 and previous studies that the heterogeneity of profit rates even within sectors 
can be substantial reflecting evidence of substantial variations in firm performance 
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within Irish industries (Anyadike-Danes and Heller, 2006). Second, there is 
substantial evidence of issues relating to transfer pricing in externally-owned 
businesses in Ireland. This can substantially distort both the cost of inputs purchased 
by plants – particularly inputs or technology ‘purchased’ by Irish plants from their 
parent companies - and/or the value of sales made by externally-owned Irish plants to 
other group plants or the marketing and sales units of their firms. For example, if an 
Irish branch is not fully charged for the cost of such external activities, this will 
artificially raise its recorded value-added or productivity. To achieve this they can 
supply inputs to the Irish branch from other parts of the firm at relatively low prices, 
or they can sell products from the Irish branch to other parts of the firm at relatively 
high prices.  In either case this would tend to artificially raise the recorded level of 
value-added or turnover per employee in the Irish branch, a pattern which may be 
encouraged by relatively low rates of corporation tax in Ireland.  
 
Table 1b shows descriptive statistics separately for non-innovators versus innovators 
and indigenously-owned versus externally-owned plants respectively.  There is a 
strong similarity in the patterns of characteristics: innovators/externally-owned plants 
are larger, more capital intensive, have more highly qualified staff, are more export 
intensive and have higher market shares than non-innovating/indigenous plants.  
Innovators are also nearly twice as likely to be externally-owned as non-innovators, 
and externally-owned plants are significantly more likely than indigenously-owned 
plants to be innovators, illustrating the links between innovation and external 
ownership.  However, there is no evidence of profitability differences between the 
groups: indeed the mean profitability is almost identical between the different groups, 
although with a large degree of heterogeneity in profitability performance. 
 
Two main econometric issues arise in operationalising equation (2a) and (2b): 
potential endogeneity of the innovation output measures, and heterogeneity in 
performance outcomes. The potential endogeneity of innovation output measures in 
models of business performance has been discussed extensively in the literature, and a 
range of potential approaches have been adopted including two-stage estimation 
methods (e.g. Crépon et al., 1998) and the simultaneous estimation of the innovation 
and augmented production functions (e.g. Lööf and Heshmati, 2002). Here we deal 
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with potential endogeneity in innovation in two ways.   First, through the treatment 
effect,  and secondly through the fact that the IIP incorporates a built-in lag between 
innovation and performance, with profitability at time t being related to innovation 
over the previous three years8. 
 
In terms of heterogeneity, it is clear that very large variations can exist in business 
performance, and especially in profitability, across sectors. Recent studies of firm-
level performance have documented the large and persistent heterogeneity across 
firms even within fairly narrowly defined industries (Bartelsman and Doms, 2000; 
D’Este, 2005; Goddard et al., 2006), and this is apparent in the profitability statistics 
shown in Table 1. Under conditions of persistent profit heterogeneity, merely 
considering the conditional mean function of the dependent variable may obscure 
important aspects of the relationship between dependent and independent variables. 
For example, in the case of innovation and profitability one might reasonably expect 
product innovation to have variable effects on plants at different points of the 
profitability distribution. As noted in some applied work (for example Girma and 
Görg, 2005), methods such as quantile regression have been used to deal with this 
problem (Koenker and Bassett, 1978).  Quantile regression allows one to trace the 
entire conditional distribution of plant level productivity, conditional on the set of 
regressors, and has the additional advantage of providing a more robust and efficient 
alternative to least squares estimators when the error term is non-normal.  This is 
relevant in the present case as plant-level profitability is clearly not (log)normally 
distributed either for the sample overall or for its subsets (see Appendix).  In the 
analysis below we therefore employ quantile regression in addition to the standard 
panel regression estimation. 
 
Various approaches can be used to estimate the treatment-effects model (2a) and (2b). 
A two-step consistent estimator (Maddala, 1983, pp117-122) estimates (2b) as a 
probit model in the first step, and augments equation (2a) with a hazard function 
                                                 
8 The empirical model effectively assumes that ownership is exogenous to both innovation and 
profitability.  In the context of the relatively short panel in operation this is justifiable: in practice, less 
than two percent of plants change ownership during the period of the study.  In the longer run  there 
may, of course, be a more general relationship both between profitability and subsequent innovation 
performance, and between performance and ownership i.e. the most profitable/innovative plants may 
become the subject of external takeover. 
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computed by the estimates of (2b). However, we opt to apply the full maximum 
likelihood estimation (Greene, 2005, pp787-789), which delivers more efficient 
estimates.   
 
4.  Results of Estimation 
 
The initial estimations (Table 2) provides a baseline for exploring the innovation-
profitability relationship for our entire sample of plants (column 1). Size and capital 
intensity have significant coefficients.  There is also some impact on profitability 
arising from the country of ownership: non-US externally-owned plants are 
significantly less profitable than indigenously-owned or UK/US-owned plants. The 
effect of innovation is clear: being an innovator makes a plant more profitable, even 
after allowing for the (significant) treatment effect of innovation. However, there is no 
profitability boost from additional innovation: the inclusion of the extent of 
innovation (i.e. proportion of new products as a proportion of total sales) proved 
insignificant in all estimations (not shown).  
 
Quantile regression estimations (Table 2, columns 2-6) shed further light on the roles 
of innovation and ownership.  Results are shown for plants in the 10th, 25th, 50th 
(median), 75th and 90th percentiles of the profitability distribution. Innovation shows a 
significant effect only for plants at or below median profitability, suggesting that the 
less profitable plants obtain the greatest benefits from innovation, and the positive 
effect becomes insignificant for plants much above median profitability.  The quantile 
estimations also demonstrate that some variables which appear insignificant overall 
do have significant effects on some parts of the profitability distribution.  For 
example, export intensity is positively linked to profitability for plants at or above the 
75th percentile of the distribution.  This conforms with previous research suggesting a 
positive association between exporting and performance, although there remains some 
ambiguity about the direction of this effect (e.g. Greenaway and Kneller, 2004).  
Workforce qualifications also demonstrate significantly positive effects on 
profitability for plants at the upper end of the distribution of profitability. 
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The models outlined in Table 2 provide clear evidence of both an innovation and an 
ownership effect on profitability. But the question remains of how this occurs. Is the 
innovation effect the same for both indigenous and externally-owned plants?   And, if 
not, given the link between ownership, innovation and profitability indicated by Table 
2, are externally-owned innovators different in some way from indigenously-owned 
innovators? 
 
To tackle the first of these issues Tables 3 and 4 show profitability estimations 
derived from the treatment model conducted separately for indigenous and externally-
owned plants. The determinants of profitability are quite different.  The size and 
innovator effects noted earlier apply exclusively to indigenous plants9, which also 
display significant sectoral influences (Table 3). In addition, for indigenous plants 
there is a significant treatment effect with respect to innovation, suggesting that 
among indigenous plants innovators differ from non-innovators for reasons other than 
innovating per se. Externally-owned plants have a quite different set of profitability 
determinants (Table 4). What matters for these plants is not the boost they get from 
innovating (there is none) but instead their position in both the domestic and export 
markets.  These plants reap profits by having a high market share (except, 
interestingly, for the most profitable decile), and by avoiding markets which are 
highly concentrated.  The export intensity effect noted in Table 2 is also exclusively 
the domain of externally-owned plants: export intensity is associated with higher 
profitability at or above median profitability levels. Sectoral influences are entirely 
absent in the case of externally-owned plants:  the choice of industrial sector does not 
influence their level of profitability, as it does for indigenously-owned plants.  In this 
estimation it is also clear that US-owned plants are more profitable than UK or other 
non-US owned plants, at least for the median quantile.  Finally, there is no evidence 
of a significant innovation treatment effect for externally-owned plants.  This is hardly 
surprising, as almost all externally-owned plants are innovators.  
 
Indigenous and externally-owned plants thus have quite different determinants of 
profitability, and even after allowing for selectivity among innovators, these 
                                                 
9 Employment shows a U-shaped relationship with respect to profitability. The turning point is c.420 
employees compared with a mean employment for indigenous plants of 63, suggesting ceteris paribus 
a negative relationship between size and profitability for indigenous plants. 
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differences are not conditioned by innovation per se.  Indeed, innovation plays no role 
in the profitability of either externally-owned plants or of the mot profitable 
indigenous plants.  The final element is to determine whether indigenous innovators 
differ in their profitability determinants from both indigenous non-innovators and 
from externally-owned innovators.   
 
Table 5 shows the results of estimations carried out with the sample split into these 
three groups.  The results are striking.  For indigenous non-innovators only the sector 
matters.  Profitability in these enterprises is dictated wholly by the sector they are in, 
with plants having virtually no means of differentiating their profitability from the 
norms of the sector. Broadly, these plants are swept along by the industry, achieving 
levels of profitability which appear not to differ systematically from industry average 
levels.   By contrast, indigenously-owned innovators are able to differentiate their 
profit performance from sectoral norms to some extent.  Apart from innovation itself, 
for these plants market concentration and (low) capital intensity are key influences on 
profitability: by contrast industry effects are slight.   So indigenous innovators are 
able to insulate themselves to some extent from market influences: the structure of the 
market matters more than the market in which the firm is operating, while the reverse 
is true for non-innovators.  Indigenously-owned innovators have greater profitability 
if they are relatively small and labour intensive, suggesting the benefit of being a 
small, nimble niche operator which is prepared to introduce new products. Non-
indigenous innovators (Table 5 column 3) show virtually identical profitability 
determinants to those of externally-owned plants as a whole (c.f. Table 4), with a total 
absence of industry sector effects. 
 
The main empirical conclusions of the estimations in Tables 2 to 5 are that the 
determinants of innovators’ profitability are different from those of non-innovators 
even among indigenously-owned plants, and that externally-owned plants are totally 
different from both.  Therefore (indigenous) innovators have different determinants of 
profitability from (indigenous) non-innovators, and that this does not arise merely 
from the fact of being an innovator.  This in turn lends prima facie support to the 
findings of Gersoski et al. (1993) and Leiponen (2000) that innovators and non-
innovators differ in ways that are linked to the transformation of capabilities provided 
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by the process of innovating rather than directly to the quasi-monopoly effects of 
individual innovation events. Externally-owned innovators (virtually the same as the 
group of externally-owned plants) are not at all like indigenous innovators: they 
behave entirely differently and are subject to different profitability determinants.   
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
Although there is a substantial body of literature on the link between innovation and 
profitability, there is very little evidence on the inter-relationship between innovation, 
ownership and profitability.  The present analysis therefore sheds further light on, for 
example, the differences between innovators and non-innovators, while allowing for 
the influence of ownership. 
 
Our results suggest that, in profitability terms, innovators are not simply plants that 
innovate: their level of profitability is subject to different determinants from those of 
non-innovators.  Innovators are able to insulate themselves from market forces to 
some degree: in the case of indigenous plants, at least part of which is because of 
innovating itself.  However, the fact that product innovation per se has a negligible 
effect on the profitability of indigenous innovators at the upper end of the profitability 
distribution supports the view that it is not the quasi-monopoly rents of innovation 
which distinguishes the most profitable innovators from the rest, but the fact that these 
plants have capabilities or competences which others lack. These capabilities may be 
linked the process of innovation, but they are unlikely to be solely related to 
innovating.  There is thus support for the view of Geroski et al. (1993) and Leiponen 
(2000) that innovators are different from non-innovators, but the quantile regression 
results appear to provide little support for the view of Roberts (1999) and the 
‘conveyor belt’ hypothesis of the link between innovation and profitability.  
 
Equally important is that externally-owned plants, almost all of which are innovators, 
have markedly different profitability determinants from indigenous enterprises, and 
these differences are not directly linked to the fact of innovation per se. While 
innovation is a competitive weapon for indigenous plants, it is simply a fact of life for 
externally-owned plants.  These plants compete, and have their profitability 
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determined, in a quite different way from all indigenous plants, both innovators and 
non-innovators.  Although market share matters for the profitability of externally-
owned plants, in most respects they are not really competing against most indigenous 
plants at all. Indeed, for the most profitable externally-owned plants export intensity 
rather than domestic market share influences profitability.  In terms of profitability 
determinants, indigenous innovators and non-innovators inhabit different parts of the 
same world, while externally-owned innovators (effectively foreign plants) operate in 
a different world from both sets of indigenous enterprises. In this sense our results 
reflect comments made a decade ago by Wrynn (1997) which emphasised the lack of 
interaction between externally-owned plants in Ireland and the nation’s innovation 
system. 
 
In policy terms our results suggest both optimistic and cautionary messages. On the 
positive side our results suggest that efforts to promote innovation activity among 
indigenously-owned plants are likely to have significant longer term benefits through 
their capability effects. This may not lead to persistent innovation (e.g. Roper and 
Hewitt-Dundas, 2005) but does seem likely to be leading to behavioural additionality 
or learning effects (e.g. Buisseret et al., 1995) which in turn are contributing to 
longer-term business profitability. For the development agencies in Ireland this is a 
reassuring result given their emphasis on developing the technological capability of 
indigenously-owned plants since the Culliton Report of the early-1990s. On the more 
negative side, the lack of any relationship in our models between the innovation 
activities of externally-owned plants and their (profitability) performance raises 
potential concerns.  This finding may reflect the lack of linkages between externally-
owned plants and their Irish resource base, in turn raising some worrying issues about 
the ‘embeddedness’ of much FDI into Ireland and therefore its ‘stickiness’ in the face 
of Ireland’s increasing high relative cost base. Here, however, it is important to bear 
in mind that our analysis relates to the period 1994-2002, and much of the increase in 
investment in public R&D in Ireland under the 2000-06 National Development Plan 
actually post-dates our study. Whether in future years externally-owned plants in 
Ireland will draw more strongly on the Irish innovation system remains to be seen. 
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Table 1a: Summary statistics – Whole Sample 
     
Variable N Mean SD 
Profit (£000) 1536 1834.651 5998.553
Profit Margin (%, profit/turnover) 1536 0.209 0.192
Employment (number) 1977 113.187 248.544
Vintage (years) 1925 32.288 30.437
Capital intensity (capital investment per employee) 1661 5.294 13.954
Percentage of staff with degree (%) 1877 9.099 12.025
Export intensity (exports as proportion of sales) 1919 0.266 0.346
Market share (in sales in each sector and wave) 1770 0.006 0.022
Externally-owned plants (%) 2002 0.330 0.470
Externally-owned plants with head quarter in the UK 2002 0.060 0.237
Externally-owned plants with head quarter in the US  2002 0.094 0.292
Externally-owned plants with head quarter in other countries 2002 0.088 0.284
Herfindahl Index (HHI, sum of squares of plants’ market share in 
each sector and wave) 2002 0.022 0.066
Average product innovation success (in total sales) 2002 0.155 0.062
Source: Irish Innovation Panel, Waves 2, 3 and 4.  
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Table 1b: Summary statistics – Sample sub-groups  
Variable Definitions 
 
Non-innovating Plants Innovating Plants t-test 
 Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD  
Profit  343 858.302 1906.557 1193 2115.361 6703.777 -3.432***
Profit Margin (%, profit/turnover) 343 0.212 0.173 1193 0.208 0.197 0.309
Employment (number) 439 50.743 81.300 1538 131.010 275.868 -6.021***
Vintage (years) 417 34.300 31.001 1508 31.732 30.265 1.525
Capital intensity (capital investment per 
employee) 357 2.417 3.842 1304 6.081 15.529 -4.421***
Percentage of staff with degree (%) 408 6.276 10.323 1469 9.883 12.345 -5.401***
Export intensity (as proportion of sales) 418 0.151 0.282 1501 0.298 0.355 -7.825***
Market share (in sales in each sector and 
wave) 399 0.003 0.014 1371 0.007 0.024 -2.653***
Externally-owned plants (%) 441 0.197 0.398 1561 0.367 0.482 -6.771***
Externally-owned plants with head 
quarter in the UK 441 0.043 0.203 1561 0.065 0.246 -1.689***
Externally-owned plants with head 
quarter in the US  441 0.043 0.203 1561 0.108 0.311 -4.159***
Externally-owned plants with head 
quarter in other countries 441 0.050 0.218 1561 0.099 0.299 -3.234***
Herfindahl Index (sum of squares of 
plants’ market share in each sector/wave) 441 0.021 0.064 1561 0.022 0.067 -0.400
 Indigenously-owned  Plants Externally-owned Plants t-test 
 Obs Mean SD Obs Mean SD 
Profit  1068 903.754 1975.678 468 3959.005 10141.50 -9.448***
Profit Margin (%, profit/turnover) 1068 0.211 0.189 468 0.205 0.197 0.579
Employment (number) 1326 63 90 651 216 394 -13.522***
Vintage (years) 1285 32.931 31.654 640 30.998 27.812 1.313
Capital intensity (capital investment per 
employee) 1127 3.884 7.324 534 8.267 21.910 -6.042***
Percentage of staff with degree (%) 1261 7.775 10.739 616 11.809 13.922 -6.910***
Export intensity (as proportion of sales) 1280 0.159 0.266 639 0.481 0.385 -21.378***
Market share (in sales in each sector and 
wave) 1228 0.003 0.006 542 0.013 0.038 -9.242***
Externally-owned plants with head 
quarter in the UK 1342 0.000 0.000 660 0.182 0.386 -17.261***
Externally-owned plants with head 
quarter in the US  1342 0.000 0.000 660 0.285 0.452 -23.108***
Externally-owned plants with head 
quarter in other countries 1342 0.000 0.000 660 0.268 0.443 -22.165***
Herfindahl Index (sum of squares of 
plants’ market share in each sector/wave) 1342 0.022 0.064 660 0.022 0.070 0.153
 Overall  
 Obs Mean SD 
Average product innovation success (in 
total sales) by industry and wave 2002 0.1554 0.062 
Note: *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 2: Determinants of profitability: All plants 
  Quantiles 
COEFFICIENT overall 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
Plant Characteristics 
Employment -0.00130** 0.0000103 -0.000113 -0.000115 -0.000279 -0.000242 
 (0.00054) (0.00046) (0.00031) (0.00018) (0.00023) (0.00025) 
Empl squared 0.0000404* -0.000006 0.00000211 0.00000318 0.00000638 0.000019** 
 (0.000022) (0.000016) (0.000011) (0.000006) (0.0000075) (0.0000075) 
Plant vintage 0.000777 0.0000750 0.000886 0.000773 0.000837 0.000115 
 (0.0014) (0.0020) (0.0012) (0.00069) (0.00081) (0.00072) 
Capital intensity  -0.0991*** -0.0761 -0.114*** -0.0972*** -0.0632*** -0.0859*** 
 (0.032) (0.061) (0.033) (0.017) (0.022) (0.025) 
Staff with degree -0.00177 0.00105 0.000929 0.00114 0.00507** 0.00352* 
 (0.0033) (0.0073) (0.0037) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0019) 
Export intensity 0.0643 0.0530 0.00242 0.0842 0.289*** 0.249*** 
 (0.14) (0.23) (0.13) (0.071) (0.088) (0.091) 
Market share 2.056 3.497* 1.721 0.805 0.0635 -1.634* 
 (3.27) (2.09) (1.60) (0.99) (1.23) (0.94) 
Innovator 2.310*** 0.299 0.662*** 0.424*** 0.00820 -0.0154 
 (0.090) (0.35) (0.18) (0.10) (0.14) (0.15) 
HQ in UK -0.128 -0.119 -0.0642 0.0205 0.0523 0.169 
 (0.26) (0.31) (0.17) (0.091) (0.11) (0.11) 
HQ in US 0.175 0.240 0.207 0.133* 0.0420 0.0155 
 (0.22) (0.27) (0.14) (0.080) (0.096) (0.095) 
HQ in other country -0.620*** -0.400 -0.164 -0.118 -0.129 -0.115 
 (0.22) (0.26) (0.14) (0.076) (0.095) (0.098) 
Market Characteristics 
Herfindahl Index -0.361 2.802** 0.539 0.174 0.882* 0.450 
 (0.73) (1.31) (0.69) (0.38) (0.45) (0.48) 
Sector Innovation intensity -2.055 0.670 1.822 0.730 0.328 -0.216 
 (1.34) (2.43) (1.31) (0.73) (0.90) (0.98) 
Industry and Location Dummies 
Textiles  0.0512 0.106 0.0599 0.0602 -0.0658 -0.171 
 (0.15) (0.28) (0.15) (0.081) (0.10) (0.11) 
Wood   0.254 0.363 0.395** 0.171* 0.132 0.100 
 (0.16) (0.30) (0.16) (0.089) (0.11) (0.12) 
Paper   0.405** 1.085*** 0.901*** 0.587*** 0.341*** 0.0704 
 (0.16) (0.31) (0.16) (0.090) (0.11) (0.12) 
Chemicals  0.503*** 1.028*** 0.627*** 0.513*** 0.302** 0.136 
 (0.18) (0.29) (0.17) (0.096) (0.12) (0.12) 
Metals  0.415*** 0.895*** 0.770*** 0.532*** 0.291*** 0.0258 
 (0.12) (0.22) (0.12) (0.066) (0.082) (0.087) 
Machinery  0.492*** 0.536** 0.443*** 0.333*** 0.165 0.0817 
 (0.16) (0.27) (0.15) (0.082) (0.10) (0.11) 
Electrical  0.307 -0.00173 -0.0253 0.0460 0.0406 -0.0589 
 (0.22) (0.40) (0.21) (0.12) (0.15) (0.16) 
Transport  0.166 -0.161 0.347 0.319** -0.0398 -0.121 
 (0.27) (0.42) (0.23) (0.14) (0.18) (0.19) 
Northern Ireland -0.0415 -0.0653 -0.0992 -0.101** -0.0711 -0.0156 
 (0.075) (0.14) (0.073) (0.040) (0.051) (0.052) 
Specification test for selection 
(atanh(rho))Note 2 
-2.125***      
 (0.091)      
Selection hazard Note 3  0.0101 -0.302*** -0.207*** 0.00228 0.000438 
  (0.21) (0.12) (0.066) (0.091) (0.11) 
Constant -3.287*** -3.369*** -3.122*** -2.224*** -1.405*** -0.817*** 
 (0.22) (0.44) (0.24) (0.13) (0.17) (0.18) 
Observations 1161 1161 1161 1161 1161 1161 
Note 1: All regressions including time dummies. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * <0.1. 
Note 2: The reported selection mechanism (atanh(rho)) is the inverse hyperbolic tangent of the correlation coefficient 
rho between residual terms of main equation and selection equation, i.e. atanh(rho)=0.5[ln(1+rho)/(1-rho)]. The test 
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of atanh(rho) is equivalent to the test of the null of rho=1. Insignificant atanh(rho) indicates that selectivity bias  is 
negligible. 
Note 3: The reported coefficient of selection hazard is lambda, the parameter estimate on the selection hazard from 
the augmented regression using Maddala (1983) formulas, more specifically, lambda = rho*sigma, where sigma is the 
standard deviation of residual term in the primary equation (profitability equation in this case).  
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Table 3: Determinants of profitability: Indigenous plants 
 
  Quantiles 
COEFFICIENT overall 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
Plant Characteristics 
Employment -0.00569*** 0.000752 -0.000104 -0.00226*** -0.00135 -0.00112 
 (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.00070) (0.00086) (0.0010) 
Empl squared 0.000682*** 0.0000421 0.0000299 0.000355*** 0.000181* 0.000135 
 (0.00026) (0.00017) (0.00012) (0.000100) (0.00011) (0.00012) 
Plant vintage 0.000557 -0.00106 0.000482 0.00103 0.000455 0.000758 
 (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.00080) (0.00093) (0.00086) 
Capital intensity  -0.0561 -0.0186 -0.0315 -0.0617*** -0.0270 -0.0632** 
 (0.035) (0.059) (0.034) (0.021) (0.025) (0.030) 
Staff with degree -0.000986 0.00660 -0.000289 0.00129 0.00673** 0.00214 
 (0.0046) (0.0077) (0.0045) (0.0024) (0.0031) (0.0030) 
Export intensity 0.0631 -0.0666 -0.00386 0.0521 0.120 0.153 
 (0.16) (0.24) (0.15) (0.091) (0.11) (0.11) 
Market share 6.238 -9.789 -8.031 0.110 -1.904 -7.165 
 (13.1) (14.1) (9.14) (6.91) (8.05) (7.25) 
Innovator 2.149*** 0.325 0.519*** 0.391*** 0.0245 0.0720 
 (0.099) (0.28) (0.18) (0.11) (0.14) (0.16) 
Market Characteristics 
Herfindahl Index 1.022 1.981 1.085 0.280 1.011* 1.094** 
 (0.85) (1.37) (0.84) (0.51) (0.58) (0.45) 
Sector Innovation intensity -2.855** 0.0409 0.972 0.210 -0.728 -0.216 
 (1.45) (2.27) (1.39) (0.85) (1.04) (1.09) 
Industry and Location Dummies 
Textiles  0.0999 0.230 0.171 0.260*** 0.0521 -0.100 
 (0.17) (0.28) (0.16) (0.098) (0.12) (0.13) 
Wood   0.175 0.579** 0.436*** 0.381*** 0.0755 0.224 
 (0.19) (0.25) (0.17) (0.11) (0.14) (0.15) 
Paper   0.359** 1.032*** 0.824*** 0.611*** 0.203 0.0469 
 (0.17) (0.27) (0.17) (0.10) (0.13) (0.14) 
Chemicals  0.629*** 1.183*** 0.795*** 0.562*** 0.287* 0.231 
 (0.23) (0.31) (0.21) (0.13) (0.16) (0.16) 
Metals  0.408*** 0.838*** 0.852*** 0.592*** 0.279*** 0.0870 
 (0.13) (0.20) (0.12) (0.077) (0.095) (0.10) 
Machinery  0.466*** 0.677** 0.501*** 0.426*** 0.229* 0.00307 
 (0.17) (0.29) (0.16) (0.098) (0.12) (0.13) 
Electrical  0.436* 0.0546 0.264 0.365** 0.218 0.0347 
 (0.24) (0.33) (0.21) (0.14) (0.17) (0.19) 
Transport  0.277 0.510 0.405 0.446** 0.107 -0.0891 
 (0.34) (0.47) (0.27) (0.18) (0.24) (0.23) 
Northern Ireland -0.0710 -0.112 -0.0906 -0.120*** -0.0732 -0.0330 
 (0.078) (0.12) (0.075) (0.046) (0.057) (0.062) 
Specification test for 
selection (atanh(rho))Note 2 
-1.984***      
 (0.099)      
Selection hazard Note 3  0.00507 -0.194* -0.202*** -0.00566 -0.0124 
  (0.18) (0.12) (0.073) (0.097) (0.11) 
Constant -2.902*** -3.263*** -2.933*** -2.188*** -1.255*** -0.869*** 
 (0.24) (0.39) (0.24) (0.15) (0.19) (0.19) 
Observations 809 809 809 809 809 809 
Note 1: All regressions including time dummies. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * <0.1. 
Note 2: The reported selection mechanism (atanh(rho)) is the inverse hyperbolic tangent of the correlation coefficient 
rho between residual terms of main equation and selection equation, i.e. atanh(rho)=0.5[ln(1+rho)/(1-rho)]. The test 
of atanh(rho) is equivalent to the test of the null of rho=1. Insignificant atanh(rho) indicates that selectivity bias  is 
negligible. 
Note 3: The reported coefficient of selection hazard is lambda, the parameter estimate on the selection hazard from 
the augmented regression using Maddala (1983) formulas, more specifically, lambda = rho*sigma, where sigma is the 
standard deviation of residual term in the primary equation (profitability equation in this case).  
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Table 4: Determinants of profitability: Externally-owned plants 
  Quantiles 
COEFFICIENT overall 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
Plant Characteristics 
Employment 0.000643 0.000375 -0.000216 0.0000852 0.000108 0.000237 
 (0.0011) (0.0020) (0.00098) (0.00038) (0.00040) (0.00036) 
Empl squared -0.0000330 -0.0000283 -0.0000057 -0.0000044 -0.0000039 0.0000027 
 (0.000038) (0.000065) (0.000029) (0.000011) (0.000012) (0.000011) 
Plant vintage 0.00197 0.00517 0.000741 0.00224 0.000984 -0.00236* 
 (0.0046) (0.0068) (0.0045) (0.0017) (0.0014) (0.0013) 
Capital intensity  -0.267*** -0.204 -0.281*** -0.184*** -0.132*** -0.121** 
 (0.096) (0.21) (0.11) (0.039) (0.040) (0.051) 
Staff with degree -0.00285 -0.00909 -0.00144 0.00222 0.00510* 0.000563 
 (0.0090) (0.017) (0.0097) (0.0037) (0.0031) (0.0031) 
Export intensity -0.151 0.183 0.110 0.353** 0.389*** 0.314* 
 (0.36) (0.67) (0.36) (0.14) (0.15) (0.18) 
Market share 14.18*** 11.82 4.638 1.098 -0.0286 -1.826** 
 (4.41) (9.11) (3.40) (1.20) (1.27) (0.84) 
Innovator -2.483 -1.421 2.735 0.962 0.0675 -0.0183 
 (3.56) (5.10) (2.66) (0.98) (1.09) (1.19) 
HQ in UK 0.0274 -0.108 0.0287 -0.0201 0.0910 0.219 
 (0.36) (0.71) (0.36) (0.13) (0.14) (0.15) 
HQ in US 0.542 0.413 0.469 0.267** 0.0416 -0.0301 
 (0.34) (0.70) (0.35) (0.13) (0.14) (0.18) 
HQ in other country -0.206 -0.283 0.113 -0.0347 -0.159 -0.180 
 (0.34) (0.72) (0.34) (0.13) (0.14) (0.18) 
Market Characteristics 
Herfindahl Index -8.495*** -4.628 -0.349 -0.391 0.572 0.408 
 (1.80) (4.97) (1.91) (0.72) (0.61) (0.66) 
Sector Innovation intensity 1.429 -3.746 3.384 3.170* 3.048* 1.138 
 (4.43) (8.55) (4.37) (1.75) (1.68) (2.12) 
Industry and Location Dummies 
Textiles  0.169 1.296 -0.224 -0.334* -0.115 -0.243 
 (0.49) (1.01) (0.49) (0.19) (0.19) (0.25) 
Wood   -0.466 0.337 0.228 -0.0704 0.113 0.237 
 (0.71) (0.88) (0.72) (0.27) (0.25) (0.22) 
Paper   0.485 0.577 1.004* 0.623*** 0.551** 0.388 
 (0.57) (1.03) (0.56) (0.23) (0.23) (0.27) 
Chemicals  0.331 1.023 0.254 0.0545 0.117 0.174 
 (0.47) (1.00) (0.48) (0.19) (0.19) (0.24) 
Metals  0.163 1.049 0.493 0.148 0.214 0.0310 
 (0.44) (0.93) (0.45) (0.18) (0.18) (0.21) 
Machinery  0.219 0.777 0.00822 -0.0428 0.0175 0.109 
 (0.51) (0.96) (0.48) (0.20) (0.20) (0.24) 
Electrical  -0.311 0.758 -0.696 -0.747*** -0.442 -0.340 
 (0.71) (1.57) (0.70) (0.28) (0.27) (0.34) 
Transport  -0.205 0.192 -0.281 -0.123 -0.245 -0.385 
 (0.67) (1.38) (0.67) (0.26) (0.24) (0.34) 
Northern Ireland -0.0563 -0.344 -0.196 -0.177* -0.0293 0.0578 
 (0.25) (0.45) (0.26) (0.099) (0.099) (0.11) 
Specification test for selection 
(atanh(rho))Note 2 
1.255      
 (1.84)      
Selection hazard Note 3  0.680 -1.253 -0.428 -0.109 -0.0280 
  (2.55) (1.33) (0.49) (0.52) (0.56) 
Constant 0.446 -1.485 -4.887** -2.848*** -1.766* -0.898 
 (3.16) (4.93) (2.43) (0.89) (0.97) (1.10) 
Observations 356 356 356 356 356 356 
Note 1: All regressions including time dummies. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * <0.1. 
Note 2: The reported selection mechanism (atanh(rho)) is the inverse hyperbolic tangent of the correlation coefficient 
rho between residual terms of main equation and selection equation, i.e. atanh(rho)=0.5[ln(1+rho)/(1-rho)]. The test 
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of atanh(rho) is equivalent to the test of the null of rho=1. Insignificant atanh(rho) indicates that selectivity bias  is 
negligible. 
Note 3: The reported coefficient of selection hazard is lambda, the parameter estimate on the selection hazard from 
the augmented regression using Maddala (1983) formulas, more specifically, lambda = rho*sigma, where sigma is the 
standard deviation of residual term in the primary equation (profitability equation in this case).  
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Table 5: Determinants of profitability: split sample estimation 
COEFFICIENT Indigenous non-
innovators 
Indigenous 
innovators 
Externally-owned 
innovators 
Plant Characteristics    
Employment -0.00382 -0.00458 0.000107 
 (0.0026) (0.0037) (0.00042) 
Empl squared 0.000992 0.000547 -0.0000204 
 (0.00061) (0.00042) (0.000022) 
Plant vintage 0.00275 0.00224 0.000890 
 (0.0021) (0.0027) (0.0028) 
Capital intensity  0.0134 -0.119** -0.321*** 
 (0.066) (0.046) (0.11) 
Staff with degree -0.000392 0.000577 0.00112 
 (0.0060) (0.0036) (0.0061) 
Export intensity 0.200 0.268 -0.0914 
 (0.26) (0.28) (0.39) 
Market share -18.50 24.26 16.20 
 (14.8) (25.1) (12.8) 
HQ in UK   -0.00188 
   (0.21) 
HQ in US   0.505* 
   (0.28) 
HQ in other countries   -0.306 
   (0.25) 
Market Characteristics    
Herfindahl Index 0.777 2.557** -9.628 
 (0.48) (1.09) (9.18) 
Sector Innovation intensity -3.507 -0.730 1.109 
 (3.05) (1.98) (2.43) 
Industry and Location 
Dummies 
   
Textiles  0.698*** -0.593 0.254 
 (0.25) (0.57) (0.38) 
Wood   0.647** -0.143 -0.601 
 (0.29) (0.29) (0.68) 
Paper   0.269 0.367* 0.393 
 (0.29) (0.21) (0.39) 
Chemicals  0.672** 0.632*** 0.376 
 (0.28) (0.14) (0.26) 
Metals  0.605*** 0.329** 0.118 
 (0.21) (0.16) (0.27) 
Machinery  0.729*** 0.220 0.148 
 (0.28) (0.14) (0.26) 
Electrical  0.588* 0.276 -0.317 
 (0.35) (0.26) (0.41) 
Transport  1.079*** -0.328 -0.320 
 (0.27) (0.37) (0.40) 
Northern Ireland -0.0667 -0.249* -0.160 
 (0.12) (0.14) (0.16) 
Constant -1.569*** -1.440*** -1.531*** 
 (0.47) (0.43) (0.57) 
Observations 202 624 320 
R2  0.16 0.17 
Estimator Random effect Pooled Pooled 
BP LM test P-value 0.008 0.76 0.8473 
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Note 1: All regressions including time dummies. Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * <0.1. 
Note 2: The reported selection mechanism (atanh(rho)) is the inverse hyperbolic tangent of the correlation coefficient 
rho between residual terms of main equation and selection equation, i.e. atanh(rho)=0.5[ln(1+rho)/(1-rho)]. The test 
of atanh(rho) is equivalent to the test of the null of rho=1. Insignificant atanh(rho) indicates that selectivity bias  is 
negligible. 
Note 3: The reported coefficient of selection hazard is lambda, the parameter estimate on the selection hazard from 
the augmented regression using Maddala (1983) formulas, more specifically, lambda = rho*sigma, where sigma is the 
standard deviation of residual term in the primary equation (profitability equation in this case).  
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Appendix:  Normality tests 
 
 
Figure A1: All plants 
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Figure A2: Indigenous non-innovators 
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Figure A3: Indigenous innovators 
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Figure A4: Externally-owned plants 
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Table A1:  test statistics 
 All 
plants 
Indigenous 
non-
innovators 
Indigenous 
innovators 
Externally-
owned  
mean -1.72812 -1.700074 -1.657758 -1.866473
median -1.51676 -1.544899 -1.504077 -1.520675
std dev 1.836422 0.7652626 1.536543 2.614199
Skewness -16.136 -0.9611405 -18.41698 -12.17776
Kurtosis 315.6822 3.903376 433.4762 166.7301
Observation 1410 263 725 422
Skewness/Kurtosis tests (D'Agostino et al, 1990) for Normality 
Pr(Skewness) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pr(Kurtosis) 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.000
Shapiro-Francia (Shapiro and Francia, 1972) W' test for normal data 
P-value 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001
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Table A2:  Correlation between HHI and industrial dummies. 
Key:   
spearman correlation 
coefficient ;sig.level, p-value HHI 
Industry 
1 
Industry 
2 
Industry 
3 
Industry 
4 
Industry 
5 
Industry 
6 
Industry 
7 
Industry 
8 
Industry 
9 
           
HHI 1          
           
Industry 1 -0.057 1.000         
 0.010          
Industry 2 0.347 -0.199 1.000        
 0.000 0.000         
Industry 3 0.354 -0.131 -0.099 1.000       
 0.000 0.000 0.000        
Industry 4 -0.383 -0.167 -0.126 -0.083 1.000      
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000       
Industry 5 -0.226 -0.141 -0.106 -0.070 -0.089 1.000     
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000      
Industry 6 0.212 -0.172 -0.129 -0.086 -0.109 -0.092 1.000    
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000     
Industry 7 0.212 -0.172 -0.129 -0.086 -0.109 -0.092 1.000 1.000   
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000    
Industry 8 -0.193 -0.221 -0.166 -0.110 -0.140 -0.118 -0.144 -0.144 1.000  
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
Industry 9 0.292 -0.107 -0.080 -0.053 -0.068 -0.057 -0.070 -0.070 -0.089 1.000 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.003 0.011 0.002 0.002 0.000  
Industry 1 - 9 refer to: Food and beverage; Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear; Wood and products of wood and cork; 
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing; ,Chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel products; Basic metals and fabricated metal 
products; Machinery and equipment; Electrical and optical equipment; Transport equipment. 
 
